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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACY J. FLORENCE, 
Petitioner 
vs • 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, 
Respondent 
ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction 
In its response to Florence's opening brief, the Workforce 
Appeals Board (hereinafter "the Board") ignores established 
principles of statutory interpretation and rests its case on an 
ambiguous Department of Labor (DOL) Program Letter, The Board's 
suggestion that general language in the federal statute supports 
its position, when the specific wording of 26 U.S.C. § 
3304(a)(15) limits offsets to retirement benefit programs, not 
disability programs, ignores established rules of statutory 
interpretation. Moreover, the Board ignores case law from this 
court supporting the conclusion that the DOL Program Letter is 
neither controlling nor persuasive. 
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Priority No. 7 
II. The Plain Language of the Federal Statute Limits Offsets To 
Retirement, Not Disability Insurance, Benefits 
This court has made clear that the starting point for 
interpreting a federal statute is with the plain language of the 
statute. Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Utah App. 1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that "where statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look 
beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are 
guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed 
according to its plain language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 7 99 
P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). 
The Board fails to come to grips with Florence's argument 
that section 3304(a)(15) is concerned with retirement benefits. 
The closest the Board comes to addressing the plain language of 
Section 3304(a)(15) is its contention that Florence's SSDI 
benefits "fall within the plain meaning of the statutory words, 
'or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the 
previous work of such individual...'" Brief of Respondent, at 11. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Board has unhinged the phrase 
"or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the 
previous work of such individual" from the preceding language of 
the statute which contains very specific references to retirement 
2 
.--.it;, it programs. The Board' ? approar1! flies in - ~\e : 
ejusdem generis ruin I hat g< •,. : ^ erpretec is 
applying tc person- * things oi tiic -j.me c^ss as those 
-  ., ^ k'^ T aT-T Dictionary. Section 
_ J _ 4 { a) ( lb ) conLain^ speciiic wc •. i'"i i ! y i e l i L e i n e n t 
pay—which relate to retirement benefits, not disability 
The Board has failed to show that SSDl , >^  • * *r 
to a pension, annuity or retirement pay. Indeed, SSDl is 
distinctly ' - ! jsed on a a.ng of 
disability, ::c reaching retirement age. «. review t' 
pi-rt J \ivi\ I Liocial Security Act sections prove* ;.hi point, 
Tiie two Socidx ^e ^ . ^p^iare 
trust funds, The firs; . - ••':^' - is * :.*_ Federal Old-Age ana 
-*.
 TT c
 . ^  . * -
 n
"! ' - * "' ' - econd 
.> xnown as the "Federal Disaoiiity '•* " 42 
« /»ni/Kx
 q e e Addendum. 
SSDl ••• no a deri.:^ .ion of 
disability; :>t.d-age insurance is t>aseu vyn reacnin : ~^* - - • 
tig i ^„.e^ to ^n individual \:ur ; - "'"isurc-n. fo:* 
disability insurance oe;» :. . . r..:.;. .c 
disabled and: ftwho ha.- no: reached retirement <-^. . . 4z 
§ 423(a)(1) See Addendum. In contrast, Social Security 
retirement benefits, or "old-age insurance benefits," are 
available to every individual who: 
1. Is a fully insured individual; 
2. Has attained age 62;and 
3. Has filed application for old-age 
insurance benefits or was entitled to 
disability insurance benefits for the month 
preceding the month in which he attained 
retirement age... 
42 U.S.C. § 402(a). See Addendum. 
Title II of the Social Security Act contemplates two 
separate programs: one that begins when an individual reaches 
retirement age, currently age 65, and one that begins when a 
person is found disabled, which can even occur when the 
individual is a minor child. The first, old-age insurance, is 
permanent. Once an individual reaches retirement age and 
qualifies, benefits cannot be terminated. The second, SSDI, 
is not permanent; benefits can be terminated at any time. The 
statute provides for termination of benefits upon a showing 
that the physical or mental impairment upon which disability 
was based, "has ceased, does not exist, or is not 
disabling..." provided there is evidence of medical 
improvement and the ability to perform substantial gainful 
activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (f). See Addendum. 
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.;.u ,-. ;^GC.J:. :y Administration does not regard SSDI 
recipients as retirr '. nlc i In O'ppns i te , 
encourages recipients :c : ••,.ur ro wor-.. D_jability insurance 
- ; .ereirea or voca+-ionan rehabilitation 
services . • ine ena uiai m e maximum iiiimi?«." «>« ,; '" 
individual? may be rehabilitated into t:roriu<-*:ve activity." 
*nci 's may occur, i f 
a: SSDI recipient refuses wiLnout gooa cause LO ac -:. ~ 
rehabl.. i Lati on service?, " ° TT ~ ~. s *^'b :,, ;\-,t* Social 
Security *• - c; . .-.;.: period,, 
di.rinj which time the SSDI recipient may work and continue to 
i.eceive benefits. 4= - -r * 42? '~v See Addendum. 
The federal reav;-
never speak of it as a :-etirerre\t proqr :*• . _„ J.,..**. I di L 404 
PI seq, . . . < *a. .»o . ang^age for 
determining whether an applicant meets 
disability, or whether a recipient has egaired th^ ability -O 
work. zu .- •• ;;,. at.ions 
implementing - - *- old-age provisions do make references to 
"* ) - . . . * . ,. c; . r ement age . " 20 C , F. R. § § 404.310 e t. 
seq. 
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This court was correct in holding in Harrington 
v. Industrial Comm'n., Dept. Of Empl. Sec, 942 P.2d 961, 964 
(Utah App. 1997) that Social Security old-age benefits are 
subject to the offset provisions of section 3304(a)(15), since 
they fall squarely into the classification of retirement 
programs contemplated by the federal statute, including 
pensions and annuities. Social Security retirement shares the 
same characteristic of permanence and entitlement by law that 
is ordinarily associated with a pension or annuity. That is 
not the case with Social Security disability insurance which 
is a transitory benefit, entirely dependent upon the physical 
or mental ability of a recipient, which can change from year 
to year. 
Even assuming that the plain language of the statute were 
not clear, and that resort to legislative history were 
necessary, the available history supports Florence's position. 
She pointed out in her opening brief that Congress intended to 
address the problem of persons "who had actually withdrawn 
from the workforce" and were receiving unemployment. Brief of 
the Petitioner, at 22. The available federal legislative 
history shows section 3304(a)(15) was aimed specifically at 
public and private pensions, railroad retirement annuities, 
6 
Social Security retirement benefits and military retirement. 
The Board has failed to point to anything in the legislative 
history to support its position that Congress intended to 
include SSDI benefits. 
III. The Board's Position Is An Impermissible Expansion of 
the Federal Statute 
Having failed to show from the plain language of the 
federal statute that Congress intended to include SSDI in the 
offset provisions, the Board next suggests that its position 
is justified by the state statute which makes reference to 
"disability retirement pay." The discussion previously has 
shown that Social Security disability and Social Security 
retirement are distinctly different programs. Joinder of the 
two terms in the state statute to produce "disability 
retirement" creates a patent ambiguity. Does the term 
"disability retirement" mean benefits commencing when someone 
is found disabled or does it mean benefits commencing when 
retirement age is reached? Or does it mean both events must 
occur? The Board does not address this thorny issue, choosing 
instead to blithely presume that the state statute is 
conclusive. 
7 
Despite the inherent ambiguity, the Board points to 
nothing to support its conclusion that "disability retirement" 
means SSDI. The Board identifies no definitions, no 
legislative history, no case law, nothing with which to 
support its bare conclusion. Far more is required of a 
litigant who proposes to interpret a federal statute so as to 
include a program not clearly intended by Congress to be 
subject to the offset. 
The Board goes on to argue that even if support for its 
position cannot be found in the plain language of section 
3304(a)(15), it is justified by this court's holding in 
Harrington v. Industrial Comm'n., at 965, that a state may 
broaden the definition of its deduction of pension payments 
beyond the conditions in which the deduction is required under 
Federal law..." Brief of Respondent, at 12. The court's 
opinion cannot be read as allowing wholesale redefining of the 
offset provisions beyond the intent of Congress as expressed 
in federal law. Even the Board recognizes that the benefit 
programs which are subject to deduction are limited, since it 
agrees that temporary disability insurance benefits cannot be 
deducted from a recipient's unemployment compensation. It is 
more reasonable to say that a state may broaden its definition 
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to include types of retirement programs not specifically 
described by section 3304(a)(15) but may not use a definition 
that sweeps up benefits, such as SSDI, when there is no basis 
for concluding that Congress intended they be included. 
The Board's argument at page 12 of its brief that SSDI 
payments are based on years of service and, therefore, must be 
considered retirement income fails both factually and 
logically. The Board asserts that Mr. Eimers testified at 
Florence's hearing that the benefits she was receiving from 
Social Security were "based on her own earnings and at least 
in part on her years of credited service." Brief of 
Respondent, at 12. Actually, Eimers' testified that the 
benefits were based on quarters of coverage and that an entire 
year's worth of coverage could be earned in one week of a 
quarter. T2-11-12. Moreover, Eimers testified unequivocally 
that a hypothetical 35-year-old disabled person receiving SSDI 
would "definitely not" be receiving retirement income. T2-14. 
The Board's argument also fails, because it is premised 
on the assumption that the language in section 3304(a)(15) 
referring to "any other similar periodic payment which is 
based on the previous work of such individual..." includes 
SSDI benefits. As has been shown above, this premise is 
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faulty. The quoted language applies to specific types of 
retirement programs, based on an individual's previous work. 
If it is read as encompassing every type of program based on 
an individual's previous work, then it would logically include 
temporary disability insurance and workers compensation, 
programs which the Board agrees are excluded. 
IV. The DOL Program Letter is Not Controlling in This Case 
After passing over Florence's argument that the specific, 
plain language of section 3304(a)(15) limits it to retirement 
programs, the Board next presumes an ambiguity in the federal 
statute, thereby permitting consideration of extraneous 
sources, in this case, a Department of Labor Program Letter. 
Brief of the Respondent, at 12. The Board makes this 
assertion without first discussing this court's holding in 
Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d at 1305 concerning the deference 
owed to an agency's interpretation of a statute. The court 
approved of principles established in other cases that only 
agency interpretations promulgated and published as 
regulations enjoy the full force and effect of law. An agency 
policy in the form of an action transmittal, or in this case a 
program letter, is interpretive, rather than substantive, and 
is not entitled to the force and effect of law, nor is it 
10 
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was never promulgated as a federal regulatic" "~irtherf :t 
] v 
.._ clear that it is intended to apply to SSDI benefits. 
First,- it does not make specific reference to Social Security 
D:i sab:i ] :i by 1 ! iomrn 
supports the conclusion that it does not refer to SSDI 
benefits which are temporary and have n^ connection to 
r e t i r e m e n T'lio cr\ t i ca 1 I n : <~ n 6 l: :>f 
the Program, Letter and contains repeated references to 
i I i re me ill, L ue unit" , • • 
Because Section 3 304(a)(15), FUTA, specifies 
that the reductions I n unemp1oyme n t 
compensation must occur for reti rement 
payments 'based on the previous work of such 
individual,' the reduction applies only to 
retirement income collected by the person who 
actually earned this income. (Emphasis 
added), 
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excluding SSDI: 
Amounts equal to other types of disability 
compensation such as temporary disability 
insurance and worker's compensation 
(including Black Lung benefits), which are 
not payable as retirement or pension payment, 
also are not required by Section 3304(a)(15), 
FUTA, to be deducted. (Emphasis added). 
It has been shown previously that SSDI benefits are temporary, 
not permanent. Moreover, they are insurance benefits. Thus, 
the term "temporary disability insurance" in the Program 
Letter can reasonably be read as referring to SSDI. Moreover, 
SSDI is not payable as a retirement or pension payment. In 
sum, the language used in the DOL Program Letter actually 
supports the argument that SSDI benefits are excluded. 
After excluding temporary disability insurance benefits 
from the offset provisions of Section 3304(a)(15), the Program 
Letter then introduces the ambiguous term "disability 
retirement benefits" in a list of "programs or plans... 
subject to the pension offset requirements..." Even if this 
ambiguous language can be read in the way suggested by the 
Board, it should not be considered binding on the court, since 
it is not reasonable and consistent with the overall design 
and purpose of the federal unemployment compensation program. 
The best available federal legislative history shows that the 
design and purpose of section 3304(a)(15) was to apply an 
12 
offset against unemployment- rompensatic benefits when a 
perso: t 11: < : • 1: : t ; ; \ i i "' " • woiKiurce through retirement 
receives benefits uncle: n : etirement program,. It is not 
reasonable and consistent to expai id tl 1a t pur pos< = 1 >} i i ise: I :. i „ :j 
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The Board prefers to f~cus on the T»roqr?n Let^rr, because 
disability insurance benefits; it is concerned solely with 
retirement benefits, The oortinent n anT^aero of Section 
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CONCLUSION 
Florence has established that the federal statute in 
question does not apply so as to require an offset of her SSDI 
benefits during the brief time she was receiving unemployment 
compensation. The Board has not presented persuasive reasons 
for inserting disability insurance into the federal statute, 
when well-established principles of statutory interpretation 
direct a conclusion that Congress intended the statute to 
apply only to retirement benefits. For this reason, the court 
should reverse the Board and find there is no overpayment. 
lis cJ^ 
XJJ 
DATED thi o^__Tday of-^ecember, 2 000. 
fichael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following on this^2^_ day of December, 2000: 
Lorin R. Blauer 
Attorney for Workforce Appeals Board 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45244 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Social Security Social Security 
Act This Title Act This Title 
1925 1396r-6 1928 1396s 
1926 1396r-7 1929 1396t 
1927 1396r-8 1930 1396u 
WESTLAW Computer Assisted Legal Research 
WESTLAW supplements your legal research in many ways. WESTLAW 
allows you to 
• update your research with the most current information 
• expand your library with additional resources 
• retrieve direct history, precedential history and parallel citations with 
the Insta-Cite service 
For more information on using WESTLAW to supplement your research, 
see the WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide, which follows the Explana-
tion. 
§ 4 0 1 . Trust Funds 
(a) Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund 
There is hereby created on the books of the Treasury of the 
United States a trust fund to be known as the "Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund". The Federal Old-Age and Surviv-
ors Insurance Trust Fund shall consist of the securities held by the 
Secretary of the Treasury for the Old-Age Reserve Account and the 
amount standing to the credit of the Old-Age Reserve Account on 
the books of the Treasury on January 1, 1940, which securities and 
amount the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to 
transfer to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
Fund, and, in addition, such gifts and bequests as may be made as 
provided in subsection (i)(l) of this section, and such amounts as 
may be appropriated to, or deposited in, the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund as hereinafter provided. There is 
hereby appropriated to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insur-
ance Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for 
each fiscal year thereafter, out of any moneys in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, amounts equivalent to 100 per centum of— 
(1) the taxes (including interest, penalties, and additions to 
the taxes) received under subchapter A of chapter 9 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (and covered into the Treasury) 
which are deposited into the Treasury by collectors of internal 
revenue before January 1, 1951; and 
(2) the taxes certified each month by the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue as taxes received under subchapter A of 
chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 which are 
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deposited into the ] ; •. a-ury by collectors of internal revenue 
after December 31, 1950, and before January 1, 1953, with 
respect to assessn^^1 ^f siich taxes made before January 1, 
1951; and 
(3) the taxes imposed by cei A of chaptf e 
Internal Revenue Code of 19 respect to wa?w 
fined in section 1426 of such *nd by chapter 21 (other 
than sections 3101(b) am' ~ Title 26 with respect to 
wages (as defined in section DI^I u +1° 26) reported to the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue p to section 1420(c) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1Q" —r 31, 1950, 
or to the Secretary of the Treasur >ursuant to 
subtitle F of Title 26 after Decern <*rmined by 
the Secretary of the Treasure h\ -ates of 
tax under such subchapter or cnapici z.i v • -i^nv 
3101(b) and 3111(b)) to such wages, whi 
certified by the Secretary of Health and Hun MCCS on the 
basis of the records of wages established a * maintained b> 
such Secretary in accordance with such reports, .ess the 
amounts specified in clause < :» of subsection (b) ol thi* sccuon, 
and 
^ j
 t ^ e t a x e s i m p 0 s e c i ^ o^.^^u^' t^ . , ol Ui\KV ( 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, with respect to self-em; iovmcp: 
income (as defined in section 481 of such Code), and by chapter 
2 (other than section 1401(b)) of Title 26 with respect to self-
employment income (as defined in section 1402 of Title 26) 
reported to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on tax 
returns under such subchapter or to the Secretary of the Trea 
sury or his delegate on tax returns under subtitle F of Title 26, 
as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the 
applicable rate of tax under such subchapter or chapter (other 
than section 1401(b)) to such self-employment income, which 
self-employment income shall be certified by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services on the basis of the records of self-
employment income established and maintained by the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services in accordance with such 
returns, less the amounts specified in clause (2) of si ibsec^V-
(b) of this section. 
The amounts appropriated by clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection 
shall be transferred from time to time from the general fund in the 
Treasury to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
Fund, and the amounts appropriated by clauses (1) and (2) of 
subsection (b) of this section shall be transferred from time to time 
from the general fund in the Treasury to the Federal Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund, such amounts to be determined on the basis 
of estimates by the Secretary of the Treasury of the taxes, specified 
in clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, paid to or deposited into 
the Treasury; and proper adjustments shall be made in amounts 
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subsequently transferred to the extent prior estimates were in 
excess of or were less than the taxes specified in such clauses (3) 
and (4) of this subsection. All amounts transferred to either Trust 
Fund under the preceding sentence shall be invested by the Manag-
ing Trustee in the same manner and to the same extent as the other 
assets of such Trust Fund. Notwithstanding the preceding sen-
tence, in any case in which the Secretary of the Treasury deter-
mines that the assets of either such Trust Fund would otherwise be 
inadequate to meet such Fund's obligations for any month, the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer to such Trust Fund on the 
first day of such month the amount which would have been trans-
ferred to such Fund under this section as in effect on October 1, 
1990; and l and such Trust Fund shall pay interest to the general 
fund on the amount so transferred on the first day of any month at 
a rate (calculated on a daily basis, and applied against the differ-
ence between the amount so transferred on such first day and the 
amount which would have been transferred to the Trust Fund up to 
that day under the procedures in effect on January 1, 1983) equal to 
the rate earned by the investments of such Fund in the same month 
under subsection (d) of this section. 
(b) Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund 
There is hereby created on the books of the Treasury of the 
United States a trust fund to be known as the "Federal Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund". The Federal Disability Insurance Trust 
Fund shall consist of such gifts and bequests as may be made as 
provided in subsection (i)(l) of this section, and such amounts as 
may be appropriated to, or deposited in, such fund as provided in 
this section. There is hereby appropriated to the Federal Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and 
for each fiscal year thereafter, out of any moneys in the Treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, amounts equivalent to 100 per centum 
of— 
(1)(A) Vi of 1 per centum of the wages (as defined in section 
3121 of Title 26) paid after December 31, 1956, and before 
January 1, 1966, and reported to the Secretary of the Treasury 
or his delegate pursuant to subtitle F of Title 26, (B) 0.70 of 1 
per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December 
31, 1965, and before January 1, 1968, and so reported, (C) 0.95 
of 1 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem-
ber 31, 1967, and before January 1, 1970, and so reported, (D) 
1.10 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem-
ber 31, 1969, and before January 1, 1973, and so reported, (E) 
1.1 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem-
ber 31, 1972, and before January 1, 1974, and so reported, (F) 
1.15 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem-
ber 31, 1973, and before January 1, 1978, and so reported, (G) 
1.55 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem-
168 
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Omitted 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
long term commitments to old-age, sur qjueu additional information be 
vivors, and disability insurance pro- .ej. in these reports, was omitted 
grams, appointed personnel and provid- the Code in view of the termi 
ed for their compensation, required a nation of the initial Advisory Council on 
report of the findings and recommenda- submission of their report not later than 
tions of the Council to be submitted to Jan. 1, 1959, the repeal of subsec. (e) by 
the Secretary of the Board of Trustees of Pub L. 89-97, Title I, § 109(b), July 30, 
the abovementioned Trust Funds not la- 1965, 79 Stat. 340, which provided for 
ter than Jan. 1, 1959, at which time the the subsequent Advisory Councils, and 
Council terminated, provided for subse- the obsolescence of subsec. (f), which 
quent Advisory Councils to be appointed provided for additional information in 
in 1963, 1966, and every fifth year there- reports to Congress, upon the repeal of 
after and to submit reports to Congress, subsec (e) 
§ 402. uu tif»t iiiiiiJ survhors insurance benefit payments 
(a) oicl-age insurance benefits 
Every individual who— 
(1) is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414(a) 
of this title), 
(2) has attained age 62, and 
(3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was 
entitled to disability insurance benefits for the month preceding 
the month in which he attained retirement; age (as defined in 
section 416(/) of this title), 
shall be entitled to an old-age iiisuran.ee bend J loi . i I. iL 
beginning with— 
(A) in the case of an individual who has attained retirement 
age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), the first month in 
which such individual meets the criteria specified in para-
graphs (1), (2), and (3), or 
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained age 62, but 
has not attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(/) of 
this title), the first month throughout which such individual 
meets the criteria specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) (if in that 
month he meets the criterion specified in paragraph (3)) 
and ending with the month preceding the month in which he dies. 
Except as provided in subsection (q) and subsection (w) of this 
section, such individual's old-age insurance benefit for any month 
shall be equal to his primary insurance amount (as defined in 
section, 415(a) of this title) for such month. 
(b) Wife's insurance benefits 
(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every 
divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an 
individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such 
wife or such divorced wife— 
(A) has filed application loi \\iit'"» •• -.i inn in i hei'n fits, 
OLD-AGE, ETC., INSURANCE 42 § 422 
tal disability and 45 percent permanent right of intervention in action challeng-
partial disability to claimant was not ing legality of standards by which claims 
controlling upon Secretary in proceed- for disability benefits are evaluated. 
ings by claimant to establish a period of Dixon v. Heckler, D.C.N.Y.1984, 589 
disability under § 416(i) of this title, F.Supp. 1512. 
since each fact-finding agency is entitled 
to make its own decision upon the evi- 10. Consultative examinations 
dence before it. Stuckey v. Flemming, Medical evidence that supplemental 
D.C.Or.1959, 188 F.Supp. 1. security income claimant may have suf-
That one seeking to establish period of fered from anxiety and nerves and a lot 
disability under this subchapter was de- of stress, along with her own testimony 
termmed to have total disability by of mental problems, may have been 
Workmen's Compensation Commission- enough to require consultative psycho-
er of state was not binding upon Secre- logical examination. McCall v. Bowen, 
tary. Carpenter v. Flemming, D.C.W.Va. C.A.11 (Ala.) 1988, 846 F.2d 1317. 
1959, 178 F.Supp. 791.
 XKTU , , , .. c 
r
*^ Where neurological evaluation of s o 
9. Intervention cial security disability benefits claim-
State of New York's interest arising ant's headaches was necessary and psy-
out of its responsibility for making ini- chiatric or psychological and orthopedic 
tial determinations whether individuals examination were necessary in order to 
are disabled for purposes of federal sup- properly evaluate her anxiety and back 
plemental security income and old age and toe impairments and to determine 
survivors and disability insurance pro- whether her complaints of pain were 
grams and threat of possible federal psychological in origin, administrative 
take-over of the state's program if it re- law judge erred by failing to order con-
fused to follow regulations it believed to sultative examinations. Dozier v. Heck-
be illegal adequately supported state's ler, C.A.Ark.1985, 754 F.2d 274. 
§ 4 2 2 . Rehabilitation services 
(a) Referral for rehabilitation services 
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress lhat disabled 
individuals applying for a determination of disability, and disabled 
individuals who are entitled to child's insurance benefits, widow's 
insurance benefits, or widower's insurance benefits, shall be 
promptly referred to the State agency or agencies administering or 
supervising the administration of the State plan approved under 
Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 720 et seq.] 
for necessary vocational rehabilitation services, to the end that the 
maximum number of such individuals may be rehabilitated into 
productive activity. 
(b) Deductions on account of refusal to accept rehabilitation services 
(1) Deductions, in such amounts and at such time or times as the 
Secretary shall determine, shall be made from any payment or 
payments under this subchapter to which an individual is entitled, 
until the total of such deductions equals such individual's benefit or 
benefits under sections 402 and 423 of this title for any month in 
which such individual, if a child who has attained the age of 
eighteen and is entitled to child's insurance benefils, a widow, 
widower, surviving divorced wife, or surviving divorced husband 
who has not attained age 60, or an individual entitled to disability 
insurance benefits, refuses without good cause to accept rehabilita-
tion services available to him under a State plan approved under 
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Title I of the Rehabilitation Ait of 1973 129 U.S.C.A. § 720 el seq.J. 
Any individual who is a member or adherent of any recognized 
church or religious sect which teaches its members or adherents to 
rely solely, in the treatment and cure of any physical or mental 
impairment, upon prayer or spiritual means through the applica-
tion and use of the tenets or teachings of such church or sect, and 
who, solely because of his adherence to the teachings or tenets of 
such church, or sect, refuses to accept rehabilitation services avail-
able to him under a State plan approved under Title I of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 720 et seq.], shall, lor the 
purposes of the first sentence of this subsection, be deemed to have 
done so with good cause. 
(2) Deductions shall be made from any child's insurance benefit 
to which a child who has attained the age of eighteen is entitled or 
from any mother's or father's insurance benefit to which a person is 
entitled, until the total of such deductions equals such child's 
insurance benefit or benefits or such mother's or father's insurance 
benefits or benefits under section 402 of this title for any month in 
which such child or person entitled to mother's or father's insur-
ance benefits is married to an individual who is entitled to disabili-
ty insurance benefits and in which such individual refuses to accept 
rehabilitation services and a deduction, on account of such refusal, 
is imposed under paragraph (1) of this subsection. If both this 
paragraph and paragraph (3) of this subsection are applicable to a 
child's insurance benefit for any month, only an amount equal to 
such benefit shall be deducted. 
(3) Deductions shall be made IIOIH any wife's, husband's, or 
child's insurance benefit, based on the wages and self-employment 
income of an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, to 
which a wife, divorced wife, husband, divorced husband, or child is 
entitled, until the total of such deductions equals such wife's, 
husband's, or child's insurance benefit or benefits under section 402 
of this title for any month in which the individual, on the basis of 
whose wages and self-employment income such benefit was pay-
able, refuses to accept rehabilitation services and deductions, on 
account of such refusal, aie imposed under paragiaph (1) nf this 
subsection 
(4) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to an\ child 
entitled to benefits under section 402(d) of this title, if he has 
attained the age of 18 but has not attained the age of 22, for any 
month during which he is a full-time elementary or secondary 
school student (as defined and determined under section 402(d) of 
this title). 
(c) "Period of trial work" defined 
(1) The term "period of trial work", with respect to an individual 
entitled to benefits under section 423, 402(d), 402(e), or 402(f) of 
IIS? 
OLD-AGE, ETC., INSURANCE 42 §422 
this title, means a period of months beginning and ending as 
provided in paragraphs (3) and (4). 
(2) For purposes of sections 416(i) and 423 of this title, any 
services rendered by an individual during a period of trial work 
shall be deemed not to have been rendered by such individual in 
determining whether his disability has ceased in a month during 
such period. For purposes of this subsection the term "sendees" 
means activity which is performed for remuneration or gain or is 
determined by the Secretary to be of a type normally performed for 
remuneration or gain. 
(3) A period of trial work for any individual shall begin with the 
month in which he becomes entitled to disability insurance bene-
fits, or, in the case of an individual entitled to benefits under 
section 402(d) of this title who has attained the age of eighteen, with 
the month in which he becomes entitled to such benefits or the 
month in which he attains the age of eighteen, whichever is later, 
or, in the case of an individual entitled to widow's or widower's 
insurance benefits under section 402(e) or (f) of this title who 
became entitled to such benefits prior to attaining age 60, with the 
month in which such individual becomes so entitled. Notwith-
standing the preceding sentence, no period of trial work may begin 
for any individual prior to the beginning of the month following 
September 1960; and no such period may begin for an individual in 
a period of disability of such individual in which he had a previous 
period of trial work. 
(4) A period of trial work for any individual shall end with the 
close of whichever of the following months is the earlier: 
(A) the ninth month, beginning on or after the first day of 
such period, in which the individual renders services (whether 
or not such nine months are consecutive); or 
(B) the month in which his disability (as defined in section 
423(d) of this title) ceases (as determined after application of 
paragraph (2) of this subsection). 
(5) In the case of an individual who becomes entitled to benefits 
under section 423 of this title for any month as provided in clause 
(ii) of subsection (a)(1) of such section, the preceding provisions of 
this subsection shall not apply with respect to services in any month 
beginning with the first month for which he is so entitled and 
ending with the first month thereafter for which he is not entitled 
to benefits under section 423 of this title. 
(d) Costs of rehabilitation services from trust funds 
(1) For purposes of making vocational rehabilitation services 
more readily available to disabled individuals who are— 
(A) entitled to disability insurance benefits under section 423 
of this title, 
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Note 4 
4. Remand riod of attendance the administrative 
Although work which social security law judge, on remand, was to determine 
disability benefits claimant performed P e n o d °/ c * a ™ a n t s attendance and evi-
u-i • r\cc- C\T •• I £ u UT* dence of attendance during dates within 
while in Office of Vocational Rehabihta-
 ±e ^ W Q r k i o d W(fre n Q t ^ 
tion program to qualify for workers
 c o n s i d e r e d in determining whether dis-
compensation payments was performed ability had ceased or failed to exist in a 
for "gain" for purpose of determining month during that period. Rivera v. 
whether disability had ceased, since Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare] 
record did not conclusively establish pe- D.C.N.Y.1981, 513 F.Supp. 194. 
§ 4 2 3 . Disability insurance benefit payments 
(a) Disability insurance benefits 
(1) Every individual who— 
(A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (as determined 
under subsection (c)(1) of this section), 
(B) has not attained retirement age (as defined in section 
416(/) of this title), 
(C) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and 
(D) is under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this 
section), 
shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit (i) for each month 
beginning with the first month after his waiting period (as defined 
in subsection (c)(2) of this section) in which he becomes so entitled 
to such insurance benefits, or (ii) for each month beginning with 
the first month during all of which he is under a disability and in 
which he becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits, but only if 
he was entitled to disability insurance benefits which terminated, or 
had a period of disability (as defined in section 416(i) of this title) 
which ceased, within the 60-month period preceding the first 
month in which he is under such disability, and ending with the 
month preceding whichever of the following months is the earliest: 
the month in which he dies, the month in which he attains retire-
ment age (as defined in section 416(/) of this title), or, subject to 
subsection (e) of this section, the termination month. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, the termination month for any individual 
shall be the third month following the month in which his disability 
ceases; except that, in the case of an individual who has a period of 
trial work which ends as determined by application of section 
422(c)(4)(A) of this title, the termination month shall be the earlier 
of (I) the third month following the earliest month after the end of 
such period of trial work with respect to which such individual is 
determined to no longer be suffering from a disabling physical or 
mental impairment, or (II) the third month following the earliest 
month in which such individual engages or is determined able to 
engage in substantial gainful activity, but in no event earlier than 
the first month occurring after the 36 months following such period 
of trial work in which he engages or is determined able to engage in 
substantial gainful activity. No payment under this paragraph may 
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be made to an individual who would not meet the definition of 
disability in subsection (d) of this section except for paragraph 
(1)(B) thereof for any month in which he engages in substantial 
gainful activity, and no payment may be made for such month 
under subsection (b), (c), or (d) of section 402 of this title to any 
person on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of 
such individual. In the case of a deceased individual, the require-
ment of subparagraph (C) may be satisfied by an application for 
benefits filed with respect to such individual within 3 months after 
the month in which he died. 
(2) Except as provided in section 402(q) of this title and section 
415(b)(2)(A)(ii) of this title, such individual's disability insurance 
benefit for any month shall be equal to his primary insurance 
amount for such month determined under section 415 of this title 
as though he had attained age 62 in— 
(A) the first month of his waiting period, or 
(B) in any case in which clause (ii) of paragraph (1) of this 
subsection is applicable, the first month for which he becomes 
entitled to such disability insurance benefits, 
and as though he had become entitled to old-age insurance benefits 
in the month in which the application for disability insurance 
benefits was filed and he was entitled to an old-age insurance 
benefit for each month for which (pursuant to subsection (b) of this 
section) he was entitled to a disability insurance benefit. For the 
purposes of the preceding sentence, in the case of an individual who 
attained age 62 in or before the first month referred to in subpara-
graph (A) or (B) of such sentence, as the case may be, the elapsed 
years referred to in section 415(b)(3) of this title shall not include 
the year in which he attained age 62, or any year thereafter. 
(b) Filing application 
An application for disability insurance benefits filed before the 
first month in which the applicant satisfies the requirements for 
such benefits (as prescribed in subsection (a)(1) of this section) 
shall be deemed a valid application (and shall be deemed to have 
been filed in such first month) only if the applicant satisfies the 
requirements for such benefits before the Secretary makes a final 
decision on the application and no request under section 405(b) of 
this title for notice and opportunity for a hearing thereon is made, 
or if such a request is made, before a decision based upon the 
evidence adduced at the hearing is made (regardless of whether 
such decision becomes the final decision of the Secretary). An 
individual who would have been entitled to a disability insurance 
benefit for any month had he filed application therefor before the 
end of such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such month 
if such application is filed before the end of the 12th month 
immediately succeeding such month. 
1363 
42 §423 PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
(c) Definitions; insured status; waiting period 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) An individual shall be insured for disability insurance 
benefits in any month if— 
(A) he would have been a fully insured individual (as 
defined in section 414 of this title) had he attained age 62 
and filed application for benefits under section 402(a) of 
this title on the first day of such month, and 
(B)(i) he had not less than 20 quarters of coverage during 
the 40-quarter period which ends with the quarter in which 
such month occurred, or 
(il) if such month ends before the quarter in which he 
attains (or would attain) age 31, not less than one-half (and 
not less than 6) of the quarters during the period ending 
with the quarter in which such month occurred and begin-
ning after he attained the age of 21 were quarters of 
coverage, or (if the number of quarters in such period is 
less than 12) not less than 6 of the quarters in the 12-quar-
ter period ending with such quarter were quarters of cover-
age, or 
(ill) in the case of an individual (not otherwise insured 
under clause (i)) who, by reason of section 416(i)(3)(B)(ii) 
of this title, had a prior period of disability that began 
during a period before the quarter in which he or she 
attained age 31, not less than one-half of the quarters 
beginning after such individual attained age 21 and ending 
with the quarter in which such month occurs are quarters 
of coverage, or (if the number of quarters in such period is 
less than 12) not less than 6 of the quarters in the 12-quar-
ter period ending with such quarter are quarters of cover-
age; 
except that the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this para-
graph shall not apply in the case of an individual who is blind 
(within the meaning of "blindness" as defined in section 
416(i)(l) of this title). For purposes of subparagraph (B) of this 
paragraph, when the number of quarters in any period is an 
odd number, such number shall be reduced by one, and a 
quarter shall not be counted as part of any period if any part of 
such quarter was included in a period of disability unless such 
quarter was a quarter of coverage. 
(2) The term "waiting period" means, in the case of any 
application for disability insurance benefits, the earliest period 
of five consecutive calendar months— 
(A) throughout which the individual with respect to 
whom such application is filed has been under a disability, 
and 
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(B)(i) which begins not earlier than with the first day of 
the seventeenth month before the month in which such 
application is filed if such individual is insured for disabili-
ty insurance benefits in such seventeenth month, or (ii) if 
he is not so insured in such month, which begins not 
earlier than with the first day of the first month after such 
seventeenth month in which he is so insured. 
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, no 
waiting period may begin for any individual before January 1, 
1957. 
(d) "Disability" defined 
(1) The term "disability" means— 
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 
less than 12 months; or 
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained the age of 
55 and is blind (within the meaning of "blindness" as defined in 
section 416(i)(l) of this title), inability by reason of such blind-
ness to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring skills or 
abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he 
has previously engaged with some regularity and over a sub-
stantial period of time. 
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)— 
(A) An individual shall be determined to be under a disability 
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are 
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous 
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of 
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he 
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or 
whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For pur-
poses of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individu-
al), "work which exists in the national economy" means work 
which exists in significant numbers either in the region where 
such individual lives or in several regions of the country. 
(B) In determining whether an individual's physical or men-
tal impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical 
severity that such impairment or impairments could be the 
basis of eligibility under this section, the Secretary shall consid-
er the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments 
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered 
separately, would be of such severity. If the Secretary does 
find a medically severe combination of impairments, the com-
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bined impact of the impairments shall be considered through-
out the disability determination process. 
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impair-
ment" is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, 
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medical-
ly acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
(4) The Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the criteria for 
determining when services performed or earnings derived from 
services demonstrate an individual's ability to engage in substantial 
gainful activity. No individual who is blind shall be regarded as 
having demonstrated an ability to engage in substantial gainful 
activity on the basis of earnings that do not exceed the exempt 
amount under section 403(f)(8) of this title which is applicable to 
individuals described in subparagraph (D) thereof. Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of paragraph (2), an individual whose services or 
earnings meet such criteria shall, except for purposes of section 
422(c) of this title, be found not to be disabled. In determining 
whether an individual is able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity by reason of his earnings, where his disability is sufficiently 
severe to result in a functional limitation requiring assistance in 
order for him to work, there shall be excluded from such earnings 
an amount equal to the cost (to such individual) of any attendant 
care services, medical devices, equipment, prostheses, and similar 
items and services (not including routine drugs or routine medical 
services unless such drugs or services are necessary for the control 
of the disabling condition) which are necessary (as determined by 
the Secretary in regulations) for that purpose, whether or not such 
assistance is also needed to enable him to carry out his normal 
daily functions; except that the amounts to be excluded shall be 
subject to such reasonable limits as the Secretary may prescribe. 
(5)(A) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disabil-
ity unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the 
existence thereof as the Secretary may require. An individual's 
statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclu-
sive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be 
medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the exist-
ence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, physio-
logical, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be 
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, 
when considered with all evidence required to be furnished under 
this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physi-
cian as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other 
symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 
medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the 
individual is under a disability. Objective medical evidence of pain 
or other symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or 
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laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or muscle 
tissue) must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether 
the individual is under a disability. Any non-Federal hospital, 
clinic, laboratory, or other provider of medical services, or physi-
cian not in the employ of the Federal Government, which supplies 
medical evidence required and requested by the Secretary under 
this paragraph shall be entitled to payment from the Secretary for 
the reasonable cost of providing such evidence. 
(B) In making any determination with respect to whether an 
individual is under a disability or continues to be under a disability, 
the Secretary shall consider all evidence available in such individu-
al's case record, and shall develop a complete medical history of at 
least the preceding twelve months for any case in which a determi-
nation is made that the individual is not under a disability. In 
making any determination the Secretary shall make every reason-
able effort to obtain from the individual's treating physician (or 
other treating health care provider) all medical evidence, including 
diagnostic tests, necessary in order to properly make such determi-
nation, prior to evaluating medical evidence obtained from any 
other source on a consultative basis. 
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
any physical or mental impairment which arises in connection with 
the commission by an individual (after October 19, 1980) of an 
offense which constitutes a felony under applicable law and for 
which such individual is subsequently convicted, or which is aggra-
vated in connection with such an offense (but only to the extent so 
aggravated), shall not be considered in determining whether an 
individual is under a disability. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, any 
physical or mental impairment which arises in connection with an 
individual's confinement in a jail, prison, or other penal institution 
or correctional facility pursuant to such individual's conviction of 
an offense (committed after October 19, 1980) constituting a felony 
under applicable law, or which is aggravated in connection with 
such a confinement (but only to the extent so aggravated), shall not 
be considered in determining whether such individual is under a 
disability for purposes of benefits payable for any month during 
which such individual is so confined. 
(e) Engaging in substantial gainful activity 
(1) No benefit shall be payable under subsection (d)(l)(B)(ii), 
(d)(6)(A)(ii), (d)(6)(B), (e)(l)(B)(ii), or (f)(l)(B)(ii) of section 402 of 
this title or under subsection (a)(1) of this section to an individual 
for any month, after the third month, in which he engages in 
substantial gainful activity during the 36-month period following 
the end of his trial work period determined by application of 
section 422(c)(4)(A) of this title. 
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(2) No benefit shall be payable under section 402 of this title on 
the basis of the wages and self-employment income of an individual 
entitled to a benefit under subsection (a)(1) of this section for any 
month for which the benefit of such individual under subsection 
(a)(1) of this section is not payable under paragraph (1). 
(f) Standard of review for termination of disability benefits 
A recipient of benefits under this subchapter or subchapter XVIII 
of this chapter based on the disability of any individual may be 
determined not to be entitled to such benefits on the basis of a 
finding that the physical or mental impairment on the basis of 
which such benefits are provided has ceased, does not exist, or is 
not disabling only if such finding is supported by— 
(1) substantial evidence which demonstrates that— 
(A) there has been any medical improvement in the 
individual's impairment or combination of impairments 
(other than medical improvement which is not related to 
the individual's ability to work), and 
(B) the individual is now able to engage in substantial 
gainful activity; or 
(2) substantial evidence which— 
(A) consists of new medical evidence and (in a case to 
which clause (ii)(II)! does not apply) a new assessment of 
the individual's residual functional capacity, and demon-
strates that— 
(i) although the individual has not improved medi-
cally, he or she is nonetheless a beneficiary of advances 
in medical or vocational therapy or technology (related 
to the individual's ability to work), and 
(ii) the individual is now able to engage in substan-
tial gainful activity, or 
(B) demonstrates that— 
(i) although the individual has not improved medi-
cally, he or she has undergone vocational therapy (re-
lated to the individual's ability to work), and 
(ii) the requirements of subclause (I) or (II) of sub-
paragraph (A)(ii)2 are met; or 
(3) substantial evidence which demonstrates that, as deter-
mined on the basis of new or improved diagnostic techniques 
or evaluations, the individual's impairment or combination of 
impairments is not as disabling as it was considered to be at the 
time of the most recent prior decision that he or she was under 
a disability or continued to be under a disability, and that 
therefore the individual is able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity; or 
(4) substantial evidence (which may be evidence on the 
record at the time any prior determination of the entitlement to 
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benefits based on disability was made, or newly obtained evi-
dence which relates to that determination) which demonstrates 
that a prior determination was in error. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require a determi-
nation that a recipient of benefits under this subchapter or subchap-
ter XVIII of this chapter based on an individual's disabilily is 
entitled to such benefits if the prior determination was fraudulently 
obtained or if the individual is engaged in substantial gainful 
activity, cannot be located, or fails, without good cause, to cooper-
ate in a review of the entitlement to such benefits or to follow 
prescribed treatment which would be expected to restore his or her 
ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. In making for 
purposes of the preceding sentence any determination relating to 
fraudulent behavior by any individual or failure by any individual 
without good cause to cooperate or to take any required action, the 
Secretary shall specifically take into account any physical, mental, 
educational, or linguistic limitation such individual may have (in-
cluding any lack of facility with the English language). Any deter-
mination under this section shall be made on the basis of all the 
evidence available in the individual's case file, including new evi-
dence concerning the individual's prior or current condition which 
is presented by the individual or secured by the Secretary. Any 
determination made under this section shall be made on the basis 
of the weight of the evidence and on a neutral basis with regard to 
the individual's condition, without any initial inference as to the 
presence or absence of disability being drawn from the fact that the 
individual has previously been determined to be disabled. For 
purposes of this subsection, a benefit under this subchapter is based 
on an individual's disability if it is a disability insurance benefit, a 
child's, widow's, or widower's insurance benefit based on disability, 
or a mother's or father's insurance benefit based on the disability of 
the mother's or father's child who has attained age 16. 
(g) Continued payment of disability benefits during appeal 
(1) In any case where— 
(A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance bene-
fits, or of child's, widow's, or widower's insurance benefits 
based on disability, 
(B) the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which 
such benefits are payable is found to have ceased, not to have 
existed, or to no longer be disabling, and as a consequence such 
individual is determined not to be entitled to such benefits, and 
(C) a timely request for a hearing under section 421(d) of this 
title, or for an administrative review prior to such hearing, is 
pending with respect to the determination that he is not so 
entitled, 
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